Emulating models of good governance : learning from the developments of the world’s least corrupt countries by Anttiroiko, Ari-Veikko
1 
Emulating Models of Good Governance: Learning from the developments of the 
world’s least corrupt countries 
by Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko, University of Tampere, Finland 
Abstract 
This article discusses three success stories of good governance, those in Finland, New Zealand and Singapore, and their 
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Introduction 
Good governance has been promoted by donor countries and development aid organisations for 
several decades, but advances in this field are still more rhetoric than reality. Lessons learnt are far 
from encouraging, for it seems that policy decisions and interventions either have little impact on 
unethical behaviour or else they just work extremely slowly (see e.g. Chêne, 2015; Caiden, 2013a; 
2013b; Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2011). Intriguingly, corruption seems to correlate with the wealth and 
the development stage of a country, which raises justified criticism of the prevailing ‘governance 
first’ approach and related soft forms of conditionality of development aid (Santiso, 2001; 
Andrews, 2008). 
If ‘exporting’ good governance does not sound particularly good idea, one might contemplate the 
same issue from another angle: the extent to which developing countries can potentially benefit 
from emulating the approaches and institutional arrangements of well governed wealthy Western 
democracies, albeit largely on their own terms. One reason behind the increased interest in such 
questions is the publishing of global rankings on corruption and other aspects of the quality of 
governance, the most familiar of these being the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by 
Transparency International (see Hansen, 2012). Since its launch in the mid-1990s discussion about 
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learning from best practices has proliferated (e.g. Desta, 2006; McCusker, 2006; Abdulai, 2009; 
Matei and Matei, 2011; Chêne, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015).  
 
An illuminating example of this discourse is the blog post of Marie Chêne, Senior Research 
Coordinator at Transparency International, stating that “New Zealand, Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden have been consistently ranked at the top of the Corruption Perceptions Index and are 
perceived to be the least corrupt of all the countries surveyed. They are not perfect … but many still 
want to know about how these countries have managed to contain corruption.” She also points to 
important differences in their roads to clean government: “The good news is that many countries 
can copy the transparency/accountability route to good governance. A recent study looking at the 
Finnish case concludes that, contrary to the Singapore’s top down approach to anti-corruption, 
which is economically unsustainable for most countries, this bottom-up model based on public trust, 
transparency and social capital is affordable, transferable and adaptable to very different political 
contexts.” (Chêne, 2011).  
 
Such speculations introduce new elements into the on-going development discourse. This article 
aims to shed light on this issue by assessing the relevance of the world’s least corrupt countries for 
the anti-corruption policy design of developing countries. Our approach is motivated by the paucity 
of systematic reviews of countries perceived to be successful in controlling corruption, not to 
mention the assessments of the usefulness of their lessons to developing countries (cf. Chêne, 
2015). Let us take a closer view of this discussion before defining our research problem and 
methodology more precisely. 
 
Exporting the one-best-way governance model? 
 
As pointed out by Andrews (2008), the one-best-way model proposed by the good governance 
agenda resembles a set of well meaning but problematic proverbs. It lacks consistency, seems 
inappropriate for use in the development dialogue and is not easily replicated. At worst, it may even 
impede the development of any fit-for-purpose governance model designed for each specific 
country context (cf. Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). The major weakness of such an approach, 
Andrews claims, is the lack of an effective underlying theoretical framework to assist in 
understanding government roles and structures in development, starting from the conceptual 
confusion and multi-dimensionality of good governance (Gisselquist, 2012b).  
 
Obviously, governments of developing countries may well be able to domesticate useful policies 
and measures from the least corrupt countries, especially by focussing on the time when these 
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countries had not reached their current level, building a picture with developmental challenges 
relatively similar to those of the developing countries of our time. Moreover, these lessons might be 
even more pertinent when derived from the experiences of other developing countries perhaps only 
one or two steps higher on the effectiveness ladder but more contextually connected (Andrews, 
2008, p. 391). Three critical reservations regarding such views must be made, however. First, 
similar conditions or development phase of a country in a different historical period may actually 
imply significant differences in their situations. Second, choosing another developing country as a 
model with slightly better performance level is questionable, as their factual differences in critical 
respects may be marginal. Third, choosing contextually connected countries often means that the 
country should benchmark only poorly performing governments. Thus, in order for a developing 
country to learn from the governance practices of structurally similar countries the only available 
options are mostly bad ones. 
 
If that is the case, narratives on the world’s leading clean governments merit close scrutiny, even if 
their lessons may not be as adaptable as Chêne (2011) assumes. Theoretically speaking, their best 
features could be ‘domesticated’ to a developing country context with an appropriate adjustment 
process in mind. We may call this context-sensitive emulation, which, through locally determined 
goal-setting and awareness of the realities of a given context, prevailing structures, cultural codes 
and conditions for their change, improves chances of avoiding distorted forms of public sector 
renewal, such as the institutional dualism of continuing traditional practices that undermine the 
functioning of imported governance models (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2005).  
 
Designing an anti-corruption reform agenda 
 
When considering the opportunities for learning from the good practices of governance, such 
learning should be incorporated into the broader anti-corruption policy framework of the given 
country (e.g. Matei and Matei, 2011; McCusker, 2006; Desta, 2006). A typology eminently 
appropriate for our purpose is that developed by Shim and Eom (2009), who have identified three 
distinct approaches to such a policy: (a) Administrative reform as the most commonly applied 
approach, which focusses on the improvement of the quality of bureaucracy and its monitoring as 
well as merit-based recruitment and promotion system; (b) Law enforcement or rule of law, often 
applied as a complement to administrative reform, guarantees that an appropriate system for 
prosecuting and punishing corruption is in place; and lastly, (c) Social change, which involves 
actors and forces outside the politico-administrative system, especially by increasing transparency 
and access to information, empowering citizens in public governance, cultivating a law-based 
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society, enabling a free press to perform its watchdog role, and decreasing people’s acquiescence to 
corruption (cf. Chêne, 2015). 
 
While translating policies into managerial practices, passing laws by fiat, creating new public 
institutions, or embarking on anti-corruption campaigns may not be effective, as pointed out by 
Kaufmann (2003). Traditional public sector management doctrines and conventional judiciary 
reform approaches may not, after all, be entirely suitable for most of the developing countries. More 
subtle managerial means – external accountability, transparency mechanisms, monitoring tools, a 
participatory ‘voice’ and incentive-driven approaches to prevention – should be used for providing 
checks and balances on traditional public institutions, in empowering non-traditional stakeholders, 
and in enhancing state capacity and mitigating the very unequal field of influence in countries 
striving for clean government (see Doig and Riley, 1998; cf. Desta, 2006; Hanna et al., 2011).  
 
Objective and methodology 
 
This article discusses the preconditions for developing countries to learn from the world’s least 
corrupt nations and their development paths. The research questions are the following:  
- What is the role of culture, democracy, political leadership and administrative machinery in 
combatting corruption in the world’s least corrupt countries, and how to translate these into robust 
anti-corruption policy models? 
- What are the major conditions for the domestication of development paths of least corrupt 
countries to developing country contexts? 
 
Due to the elusive concept of ‘good governance’, this discussion, while maintaining its broad scope 
as a kind of background concept, focusses mainly on corruption (on conceptual issues, see 
Gisselquist, 2012a; 2012b). In this context ‘good’ is equated with ‘clean’ or ‘non-corrupt’.  
 
Even if we discuss countries with the cleanest governance in the world, this does not imply the best-
practice or model country approach discussed earlier (Andrews, 2008). Suffice it to say here that it 
is not to be taken for granted that best-practice programmes can be in any straightforward way 
exported (or imported) to another national context (cf. Rose, 2005, p. 95). In parallel with this, our 
discussion does not take place within conventional donor-recipient relationship or within the 
development aid discourse in general, but anchors it on anti-corruption policy design in the 
developing country context.  
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Lastly, rather than importing, coping, imitating or replicating best practices we discuss learning 
about them. That is, while presenting the cases of least corrupt countries in order to learn lessons 
from their experiences, the idea is to learn or adopt different models or practices in a creative, 
contextually adjusted manner (Rose, 2005). For example, in 1962 New Zealand became the first 
English-speaking country successfully enact and implement the idea of Ombudsman originally 
developed in Scandinavia (Satyanand, 2005, p. 268). Clearly, when such an application takes place 
between countries in completely different conditions or development stages the challenges are 
amplified. A paradigmatic case is the introduction of contractual methods like competitive 
tendering, which may be even counterproductive to efficiency in a country in which the underlying 
market mechanism does not function properly (cf. Santiso, 2001; Andrews, 2008; Welsh and 
Woods, 2007).  
 
Methodologically this article is based on historically-oriented institutional analysis (Gardner, 2006), 
which establishes a scenario for the three cases of Finland, New Zealand and Singapore, which are 
used to exemplify distinct types of ethics management models and related elements of national 
integrity systems. Presenting three advanced cases with different societal and historical contexts 
helps to assess the transferability of such prominent cases by comparing the ideal types constructed 
and assessing the conditions for their general applicability to developing country contexts (see 
Hekman, 1983; Brewer, 2003). Case selection will be next discussed in detail. 
 
Case selection 
 
The case selection starts by identifying country cases potentially applicable as learning exercises for 
other countries globally. For this purpose the top 20 countries according to the Corruption 
Perception Index 2014 of Transparency International were grouped into four country groups. 
Accordingly, the cleanest group is the Nordic countries, of which Denmark, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway belong to the global Top 5. Another advanced group is ‘White Commonwealth’ countries 
of New Zealand, Canada, Australia and the UK, all in the Top 15 in the above ranking. A third 
distinguishable group is the Central and Western European countries, such as Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium. They belong to the Top 15 in the CPI ranking. 
Lastly, in the Top 20 of the same ranking there are three countries from East and Southeast Asia, 
namely Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong (see Transparency International, 2014). 
 
To keep the number of cases manageable, we select one case to represent each group, with the 
exception of Central and Western European countries, which are at least institutionally fairly similar 
to the Nordic countries, and may not bring added value for the purposes of this particular 
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comparison. Thus, one country has been chosen to represent each of the Nordic, White 
Commonwealth and Asian groups, namely Finland, New Zealand and Singapore. All are global 
benchmark cases with consistently high scores in annually published CPI rankings. 
 
The fundamental difference between Finland and Singapore, as pointed out by Chêne (2011), is 
particularly illustrative from a policy and design perspective. These countries represent utterly 
different cases among the least corrupt countries, the first being a Nordic welfare society and the 
other an Asian developmental state. Finland is a case in point because it is a late-comer in the 
Nordic context in the sense that it broke away from its agrarian roots and poverty more slowly than 
the other Nordic countries. Singapore in turn is the most successful country in the Asian context and 
thus a benchmarking case in its own right, being different from many other least corrupt countries 
in that the majority of the population is of non-Western origin. Its highly positive image is well 
deserved, for it not only broke away from its pre-independence situation but is also surrounded by 
countries in which corrupt practices are widespread (Oehlers, 2005). The primary interest in our 
third case, New Zealand, is its long-lasting reputation as the least corrupt among the 
Commonwealth countries. Contrary to Finland’s welfare state development and Singapore’s 
developmentalism, New Zealand is among the best examples of an NPM-oriented mode of 
administrative reform, which adds a special flavour to the discussion of the national framework and 
ideological basis of anti-corruption policy (Schick, 2002). 
 
All these three countries were already among the least corrupt countries in the mid-1990s when 
Transparency International started to publish its Corruption Perceptions Index. Even if there is good 
reason for caution regarding developing countries’ chances to emulate the success stories of 
historically unique cases, we may see Finland, New Zealand and Singapore as potentially 
illustrative benchmarks when considering approaches to good governance and anti-corruption 
policy in particular. (On success and failure in curbing corruption in different countries, see Caiden, 
2013a; 2013b; Chêne, 2015; Mongiu-Pippidi, 2015). 
 
The Finnish model of good governance 
 
Finland is a Nordic country with some 5 million inhabitants. It is well-known for its clean and 
transparent government, as evidenced by being continuously ranked as one of the least corrupt 
countries in the world. Finland’s clean governance model is a result of a long historical 
development, first under Swedish rule until 1809, then as an autonomous Grand Duchy of the 
Russian Empire, until the country finally gained independence in 1917. Many practices in political 
life and administration have their roots in traditional local customs and rule-making. The influence 
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of Sweden was likewise crucial throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Generally the underlying 
assumption has been, and to a large extent continues to be that the law, as is the case with rules in 
general, is to be repected (Joutsen and Keränen, 2009). Honesty and trustworthiness have likewise 
been perceived as virtues in Finnish culture. 
 
Ordinary Finns do not encounter corruption in their daily lives, which partly explains why the 
majority of them trust their public institutions (Koskinen, 2003). Part of this picture is also a well-
developed legislation, which, it should be noted, in the Finnish case has never included either a 
separate corruption law or a separate agency controlling corruption. Instead, corruption is treated as 
a part of poor governance and criminality, and is thus handled at all levels of the legislation and 
control systems, including the Constitution, the penal code, the civil service legislation, 
administrative directives and ethical norms (Tiihonen, 2003; OECD, 2000). This implies that 
corruption is approached in a holistic manner.  
 
What explains the clean government in Finland? One might evince an aggregate image of the 
reasons for the low level of corruption in Finland in light of the following factors divided into six 
thematic groups (Tiihonen, 2003; Joutsen and Keränen, 2009; Anttiroiko and Valkama, 2005; 
Koskinen, 2003; OECD, 2000): 
- Culture and characteristics of society: high GDP, egalitarianism, democratic mindset 
- The court system and law enforcement: tradition of legality, trust in police etc. 
- Administrative structures and principles: flat hierarchies, respect for the principles of good 
governance 
- Civil servants: adequate salary, merit-based careers 
- Transparent decision-making and administrative procedures 
- Consensual political culture. 
 
Culture and social conditions are the key factors in explaining the evolution of clean governance in 
Finland. First of all, Finnish society is democratic and egalitarian. It was one of the first countries in 
the world to grant all men and women the right to vote and stand for public office. The standard of 
living is moreover high, which, together with fairly even income distribution, means that the level 
of wages in both the public and the private sectors can be termed reasonable. These background 
factors also include an effective and inclusive education system. Such factors suggest that the 
Finnish public tend to have a relatively good capacity to understand, exercise and safeguard their 
rights (Joutsen and Keränen, 2009, p. 13). 
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An important element of the Finnish public administration is the impartiality and integrity of its 
civil servants. A special manifestation of such thinking is that an official may not participate in the 
taking of a decision which may benefit or, alternatively, harm his or her interests or those of another 
person with whom he or she has a dependent relationship. From a procedural point of view, the 
Finnish system is based on what is known as the referendary system, which is actually an old pillar 
of public administration (the referendary is an official responsible for preparing official matters for 
a decision-making body). It is also worth emphasising that the system is based on collective and 
collegiate decision-making, which tends to reduce the likelihood of corruption. An important 
dimension of all administrative work is transparency (Joutsen and Keränen, 2009).  
 
By international standards Finland’s anti-corruption measures and institutions are weak. It does not 
have a separate unit dedicated to the investigation or prosecution of corruption-related offences. 
This reflects the fact that the guiding principle for anti-corruption work is that corruption is not 
deemed to require separate legal provisions or separate supervisory bodies, nor even a separate 
strategy or action plan. Instead, anti-corruption measures are integrated into general good 
governance policy grounded on the rule of law and the culture that supports societal integrity 
(Joutsen and Keränen, 2009). As stated by Zook (2009), Finland’s success lies in “the continuous 
effort to enhance and integrate effective policy, efficient institutions, and a vibrant civil society.”  
Sometimes the national integrity system fails, however, as may occasionally be the case with the 
side-effects of consensual decision-making, the over-representation of the interests of construction 
companies in town planning or the prevalent overcompensation problem, as in the much discussed 
case of the excessive remuneration of CEO Mikael Lilius of the partly state-owned energy company 
Fortum in the latter half of 2000s. 
 
New Zealand’s development path 
 
In the family of Commonwealth countries New Zealand stands out as a special case as one of the 
least corrupt countries in the world. New Zealand has a reputation as a well governed country: 
democracy is consolidated and stable, most political institutions function effectively, and the 
political and civil rights of citizens receive adequate protection (TINZ, 2013).  
 
New Zealand is a small (4.6 million inhabitants) and remote country with a partly Polynesian 
history, yet as a former British colony has developed modern means of public sector management 
(Satyanand, 2005). Historically, its colonisation was begun mostly by Europeans intent on 
settlement in the 19th century. 
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Among the reasons for New Zealand’s corruption-free reputation is the importance New Zealanders 
attached to the egalitarian ethos (Gregory, 2013, p. 27). Even if egalitarianism was stronger a few 
decades ago, values surveys suggest that it is still one of the hallmarks of New Zealand’s culture. 
Such features provide major support for a high-trust society (TINZ, 2013; cf. Gregory and Zirker, 
2013). 
 
Institutionalisation of good governance has long historical roots in New Zealand. Legislation-wise 
two principal statutes against bribery and corruption were the Crimes Act of 1961 and the Secret 
Commissions Act of 1910. The Public Service Act of 1912 introduced a professional, merit-based 
public service system into the country. The cleanness of public administration is obviously one of 
the cornerstones of a pragmatic approach to anti-corruption policy, originally based on public 
service ethos, which embodied values like honour, duty, decency and a strong sense of the public 
interest (Gregory, 2013). As in many other developed countries, the administrative machinery is not 
the weakest link in the system. Rather, the problem lies in the way in which the political parties and 
politicians operate, which reflects perceived problems in the political culture in the country (TINZ, 
2013; cf. Gregory and Zirker, 2013). 
 
According to a recent National Integrity System (NIS) assessment, the strengths of the national 
integrity system of New Zealand include the effectiveness of the judiciary, the Office of the 
Auditor-General and the Ombudsman. Whistle-blower telephone lines have become common to 
enable people to report corruption and other inappropriate behaviour. And when cases of unethical 
behaviour by those in power are exposed, the media, political parties, the Auditor-General, law 
enforcement agencies, and the judiciary usually pursue these cases vigorously (TINZ, 2013). 
 
Due to a relatively good situation regarding corruption in New Zealand, anti-corruption policy is 
not among its main political issues. There is even certain degree of inertia in country’s defence of 
its clean image, including its reluctance to ratify (after signing in 2003) the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (Gregory and Zirker, 2013). It actually builds its success neither on 
an over-arching anti-corruption strategy nor on a host of institutional measures (only recently has 
the government directed work to be undertaken on developing a national anti-corruption policy). In 
line with this, it does not have any one single agency charged with fighting corruption, nor has it 
seen the need to create an independent commission against corruption. However, it has a number of 
agencies that focus on the different elements in the fight against corruption, the two major 
organisations being Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the New Zealand Police (Satyanand, 2005, p. 
268; see SFO’s website at https://www.sfo.govt.nz/). 
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In his assessment of New Zealand’s road to good governance, Gregory (2013) emphasises that good 
governance must be assessed against the country’s own standards that evolve over time and taking 
account of the historical context. For example, in spite of being a global benchmark case as a fairly 
non-corrupt country, there are developments that represent a threat to the country’s non-corrupt 
reputation, ranging from uncontrolled parliamentary lobbying to growth of organised crime and 
increased income and educational inequalities (Gregory and Zirker, 2013). 
 
Singapore’s road to good governance 
 
Singapore is the least corrupt country in Asia. In the CPI ranking of Transparency International it is 
at the same level as the Nordic countries. The country’s remarkable success in eradicating 
corruption is a much cited success story in the anti-corruption discourse. What explains its unusual 
road to clean government? 
 
Singapore is a multi-cultural country of some 5 million inhabitants, Chinese being the largest ethnic 
group. It developed as a trading port under British colonial rule, having in that respect a better start 
than many other colonised countries. In any case, corruption was a part of the everyday lives of 
Singaporeans during the colonial period, especially after the Second World War (Quah, 1988).  
 
The fact that corruption is no longer a way of life in Singapore is an indication of the effectiveness 
of the anti-corruption policy adopted by the People's Action Party (PAP) government after it took 
office in June 1959. It took decisive measures to change the corrupt system. Among the first 
decisive steps was the establishment of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in the 
early 1950s as an independent anti-corruption agency, actually the first of its kind in the world 
(Quah, 2011, p. 133). This resulted from an initiative by the colonial government after a major 
corruption case involving the police. In spite of this, corruption continued to be endemic, for 
reasons typical of developing countries (Tan, 1999). 
 
The PAP government’s strategy for dealing with the problem of corruption started from top political 
leaders, who made themselves role models for civil servants, divesting themselves of commercial 
ties, demonstrating high work ethics, avoiding any behaviour that could be construed as abuse of 
power, and showing zero tolerance for corrupt behaviour. By personal example they sowed the 
seeds of an atmosphere of honesty and integrity (Tan, 1999). 
 
The PAP government relied heavily on the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) and the CPIB to 
spearhead its anti-corruption strategy. The primary aim of the POCA and CPIB was to reduce 
 
11 
opportunities for corruption and to increase the penalties for corrupt behaviour if detected (Quah, 
1988). In the late 1980s the essential pillars of Singapore’s effective anti-corruption policy were in 
place and started to bear fruit. It was important that the CPIB since its inception investigated and 
prosecuted many leading politicians and bureaucrats, signalling to society as a whole the 
determination to eradicate corruption (Quah, 2007, p. 25). 
 
An important part of the PAP strategy was to tackle the root causes of corruption in the civil 
service. More than anything, this meant constantly improving salaries and working conditions. 
Accordingly, the salaries of Singaporean civil servants are by Asian standards fairly high (Quah, 
1988). The same policy was adopted with politicians. Top politicians have reiterated Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew’s mantra that political leaders should be paid the top salaries that they deserve in 
order to ensure clean and honest government (Quah, 1988). This is a problematic issue in countries 
like Singapore, for such an act can be interpreted as a “rent extraction” by a leader insulated from 
effective democratic control (Di Tella and Fisman, 2004, p. 477). 
 
All in all, corruption still persists in Singapore, as indeed in all societies in one form or another, but 
Singapore is not a corrupt society (Quah, 1988). However, according to a context-specific point of 
view Singapore’s corruption can be said to be distinctly political in nature, i.e. the ruling party’s use 
of public resources to retain a pre-eminent position in politics (Oehlers, 2005, p. 149). 
 
Discussion: Learning from the development paths of the top performers 
 
The three cases discussed above show that Finland and New Zealand are countries with essentially 
evolutionary anti-corruption development path. In spite of obvious differences they have much in 
common in their pursuit of well-governed society. Similar features can also be found in many 
Central and Western European countries, thereby permitting the generalisation that the Western 
countries with the least corrupt governments in the world have achieved their positions through 
evolutionary processes rooted in modernisation, which is obviously difficult to emulate. Among the 
top performers Singapore stands out as a decidedly different case, an Asian country – even if a 
former British trading post and Crown Colony – with a characteristically revolutionary approach to 
anti-corruption policy. Hong Kong resembles it in many ways (Abdulai, 2009) likewise the 
developments of West-emulating Japan. The more recent achievements of South Korea and Taiwan 
reflect the same developmentalist model (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, p. 149). It is worth stressing that 
the terms ‘evolutionary’ and ‘revolutionary’ are here justified by empirical cases, as the special 
features of their development paths differ in terms of the radicalness and speed of change. This 
implies that even if the ‘social change’ track associated with cases like Finland and New Zealand is 
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here called evolutionary, it can also be revolutionary if exceptional societal momentum produces 
rapid, dramatic changes. In any case, we may use these two categories to build two ideal types of 
anti-corruption policy, as presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Two paths towards good governance: evolutionary vs. revolutionary models. 
 
 
Features 
Evolutionary integrity-based ethics 
management model 
Revolutionary compliance-based 
ethics management model 
Country group Western (e.g. Nordic and White 
Commonwealth countries) 
Asian (e.g. Singapore and Hong 
Kong) 
Background agenda Welfare and equality (social agenda); 
welfarism; managerialism 
Development and growth (economic 
agenda); developmentalism 
Democracy Democratic system, free press, civic 
liberties, multi-party system 
Semi-authoritarian system (soft 
authoritarianism), limited freedoms, 
dominant-party system  
Role of politics Political pluralism; consensual 
institutional support for national 
integrity system 
Personalised leadership; leading 
politicians’ critical role in supporting 
anti-corruption policy 
Role of administration and anti-
corruption agency (ACA) 
Clean, transparent administration; no 
fully-fledged anti-corruption 
commission or agency 
Clean administration; special role of 
vigilant anti-corruption agency 
Major structural support for anti-
corruption policy 
Cultural values and norms Political leadership and institutional 
measures 
Development of anti-corruption 
policy 
Evolutionary; piecemeal, integrated 
policy 
Revolutionary; masterminded anti-
corruption policy 
Approach to anti-corruption policy Weak; holistic approach; no specific 
anti-corruption policy or legislation 
Strong; spearhead approach; anti-
corruption policy and anti-corruption 
law have an important role 
Characteristic measures of anti-
corruption policy  
Lenient measures: ethical and cultural 
codes and principles, instructing, 
internalisation of norms and values 
Tough measures: investigation, 
compliance, control, punishment 
 
These two ideal types point to fundamental differences in the premises of anti-corruption policy. In 
a semi-authoritarian society like Singapore, strong leadership and an efficient anti-corruption 
agency are necessary preconditions for successful policy and related cultural change. The process 
was justified by a promised reward, that is, economic growth. In the cases of Finland and New 
Zealand the development follows different logic: the cultural background facilitates non-corrupt 
procedures which rely on openness and democratic values. 
 
Let us return to a question of whether good governance can be imposed from outside. On the basis 
of the recent literature as well as the observations of the development paths of successful countries, 
we may state with conviction that exporting good governance is well-nigh a mission impossible and 
at best slow and cumbersome. The paradigmatic form of such an ‘export’ is the donor’s attempt to 
impose good governance as a part of a development aid package. Such efforts have not born fruit, 
mostly because the promotion of good governance requires local ownership, a realistic timeline for 
change and a sufficient understanding of the political economy constraints on the development in 
the given case (Unsworth, 2007; Smillie, 2007), that is, conditions which have not generally been 
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met in development aid efforts. In addition, there is an acknowledged need to link the promotion of 
good governance directly to the achievement of better development outcomes rather than to the 
replication of a particular political model (Welsh and Woods, 2007).  
 
The situation, however, does not seem to be much better outside the donor-beneficiary relation, as 
in designing developing countries’ anti-corruption policies, for according to the relevant literature 
such reforms yield only slight evidence of having much impact on the factual level of corruption 
(Hanna et al., 2011; Chêne, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). To succeed, they require, among other 
things, strong political will, inclusiveness, a sufficient salary level throughout the public sector, and 
an efficient anti-corruption agency, as seen in the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong (Abdulai, 
2009; cf. Chêne, 2015), which have proven difficult to replicate. The challenges are likely to be 
greater if anti-corruption policy is based on a social change approach derived from the experiences 
of cases like Finland and New Zealand.  
 
Such findings cast doubt on Chêne’s (2011; 2015) idea that the Finnish-style social change model 
would provide a feasible and cost-effective model for developing countries’ anti-corruption policy. 
Contrary to such an assumption, features like trust, transparency and social capital are difficult to 
introduce into a country without fruitful soil and a momentum for change. On the other hand, it has 
by now become apparent that corruption cannot be overcome by fighting against corruption alone 
(Kaufmann, 2012); it requires a more holistic integrity-building process, in which the Finnish or 
similar models may effectively serve as benchmarks (Monaghan and Graycar, 2016). A slightly 
similar idea was presented by Zook (2009), who speculated that the Finnish model might work if 
applied in parallel with the democratisation of a country.  
 
Thus the chances for successfully exporting good governance are slim, as are the chances of 
‘importing’ it – if the latter implies a lack of contextual adjustment. As concluded by Mungiu-
Pippidi and others (2011), “[t]here is a gross inadequacy of institutional imports from developed 
countries which enjoy rule of law to developing contexts.” However, there is always hope in the 
presence of a sufficient degree of local ownership and understanding of the requirements of 
successful implementation. To generalise, narratives of the development paths of top performers 
can indubitably serve as a source of inspiration to politicians, public managers and civic leaders in 
search of new ways of curbing corruption. Singapore in particular is an instructive story with its 
identifiable measures, short time span and clear outcomes, whereas countries like Finland and New 
Zealand have fewer landmarks to point out, implying a fuzzier picture of the causalities affecting 
the process (see e.g. Rose, 2005). This point is worth careful consideration when assessing the 
feasibility of the social change approach.  
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Paradoxically, even if the model of Singapore may appear feasible from the point of view of 
developing countries, it should be remembered that it was introduced in tandem with an export-
oriented industrial policy at a time of expansion in world trade. Hence, if developing countries in 
times of disrupted global capitalism have difficulties in achieving the growth needed to finance 
large-scale anti-corruption interventions, greater efforts should be invested in improving the clarity 
and operational effectiveness of the social change approach even if this is demanding in terms of 
societal and cultural conditions and likely to be a detour rather than a shortcut to good governance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is challenging to transfer the best parts of empirically constructed good governance models to a 
developing country context. Successful Western countries apparently have important similarities 
concerning the role of culture, democracy, political leadership and administrative machinery in 
combatting corruption, which are embedded in their evolutionary development paths. These are 
exemplified by the cases of Finland and New Zealand. Singapore, on the other hand, is among top 
performers a notable exception as it puts special emphasis on its political leadership and anti-
corruption agency in eradicating corruption. Paradoxically, while Singapore’s revolutionary 
compliance-based approach includes appealing elements from the point of view of developing 
countries, not least because of high remuneration for politicians and civil servants as well as high 
economic growth that is supposed to benefit all members of society, it starts to look unattainable to 
most of the developing countries in today’s world. Hence social change approach emerges as a valid 
option, even though it is hardly a shortcut to good governance. Neither an evolutionary nor a 
revolutionary model is superior as such; rather, what is important is that learning from success 
stories is used as a source of inspiration with local ownership and context-sensitive adjustment in 
mind. 
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